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The security of a system is dependent upon the security of each of the 
components.  Subsystems for a distributed system include point of access, 
communication link, authorizing agent, and delivery mechanism.  These subsystems are 
shown in Figure 1.1.  In a distributed system, such as the Internet, bank ATMs, or credit 
card gas pumps, there is limited control over the point of access.  Independent of access, 
the communication link must be secured.  Therefore, the most commonly recognized 
component of a secure system is the encryption algorithm.  The most commonly 
recognized problem in a secure communication system is encryption key management.   
 
 
Figure 1.1: Subsystems of a distributed, secure system 
 
An alternative to encryption for distributed systems is to fragment the data so that 
interception of pieces is useless.  Another alternative is steganography, which is 
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hiding the message within other information [1].   Other components and issues for 
security systems are: hashing (for checking data integrity), identity authentication (for 
allowing access), electronic signatures (for preventing revocation of legitimate 
transactions), information labeling (for tracing location and times of transactions), and 
monitors (for identifying potential attacks on the system).  Each of the components 
affects the overall security of the system.  The weakest component limits the system’s 
overall strength of security.  There is a difficulty with automatic identity authentication in 
distributed systems.  The difficulty is in part due to the human interaction with the 
system.  Divulged passwords and stolen or lost credit cards present a human aspect that is 
difficult to manage.  Identity authentication systems can decrease susceptibility to a 
security breach by adding extra dimensions or elements to the authentication of one’s 
identity [2, 3].  One clear example of increasing strength by utilizing multiple elements of 
authentication is a bank ATM system.  At the ATM, two forms of authentication is 
required, a debit card and a four digit pin number.  By itself, a four digit pin number is a 
very susceptible security measure, but when used in a multimodal authentication system, 
it adds a significant level of security.  Adding additional elements of identity 
authentication to a distributed system adds to the strength of security of the system.       
In distributed environments, system developers often have little or no control over 
the point of access equipment utilized.  The same information or system can be accessed 
by multiple terminals.  For instance, one may gain access to the same privileged 
information on the internet via numerous terminals, i.e. cell phones, PDA, laptop, home, 
school and work PC’s, etc.  As distributed systems become more complex, protecting 
them also has also added layers of complexity.  One general and widely used method of 
 3
protecting distributed systems is by automatic identity authentication [4].  Identity 
authentication systems determine whether an individual has been properly authorized to 
access a system. There are three main elements in the methods of identity authentication; 
what you know (example: password or login), what you have (example: debit card or 
key) and what you are (biometrics) [3, 6-7].  What you know requires a user to input data 
into a system to confirm that the user provided data matches previously supplied data.  
The hardware used for authentication in a ‘what you know’ system is only required to 
gather the data, how that data is gathered is not a concern for the system.  An example is 
in a login situation, where it does not matter if the data is transferred from user to system 
via keypad or a 'speech recognition / conversion' system.  As long as the data is submitted 
correctly, the system can authorize access for that user.  When utilizing the means of 
‘what you have’ to authenticate one’s identity, the system is completely hardware 
dependent.  It is hardware dependent because the item ‘you have’ is hardware and the 
device that authenticates the item’ you have’ also is hardware.  A ‘what you have’ system 
is a key-receptacle system.  To be authenticated, the key and the receptacle must match.  
One cannot enter into their hotel room by swiping a credit card into the door key reader.  
One advantage of this system is that the system designer has control of both the key and 
the key reader.  They are designed to work together.   
Biometrics is different.  Biometrics is the actual measure of what you are or what 
you do [5].  Instead of the user inputting data for comparison or furnishing an object for 
purposes of authentication, biometric authentication is the actual measure of a feature of 
the user.   The measure of that feature is compared to an earlier measurement of the same 
feature of the user to authenticate one’s identity.  In the case of biometrics, the 
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measurement devices may have an effect on the actual measurement.  For instance, a 
simple biometric would be to measure one’s height.  Assume that the height measurement 
is recorded correctly when the person was being enrolled as an authorized user.  At a later 
date the user then attempts to gain access to the system.  If the measurement device is one 
half inch higher than when at first, the user could be falsely rejected from gaining system 
access.  In many distributed environment, the potential for measurement devices to vary 
is great.  Measurement variation can have a significant detrimental effect on an identity 
authentication system.    
This investigation is concerned with one particular biometric, the biometric of 
voice.  Speaker recognition systems use one’s voice as a metric to detect a specific 
speaker [7].  For speaker recognition systems in a distributed environment, such as the 
internet, microphones are certain to vary.  Frequency response to various microphones 
can vary widely.  Two different microphones can produce two dissimilar signals for the 
exact same recording.  In a speaker recognition system microphone dissimilarity may 
lead to, 1) a significant enough dissimilarity to cause the system to fail to recognize the 
speaker, or 2) a dissimilarity  not significant enough to affect the system’s ability to 
recognize the speaker.  The opposite is true for imposter speakers as well.  Microphone 
effects may be significant / insignificant enough to alter/not alter the imposter rejection 
capability of the speaker recognition system.  To discover whether or not the effects of 
varying microphones has a significant detrimental effect on the ability of a speaker 
recognition system perform identity authentication is the objective of this research.  To 
accomplish this objective, voice samples from a group of people, spoken into a set of 
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digital recording systems were submitted to a speaker recognition system and the error 







Section 1 – Identity Authentication 
With an ever growing networked-world, where a large amount of sensitive data is 
digitized and security is in high demand, identity authentication has come to play a vital 
role in security.  Multimodal systems have been given more credence to increase a 
system’s security [8-10].  A recent trip to a popular amusement park in south Texas 
affords a good example of a multimodal identity authentication system.  Upon your first 
gate entrance to the park, your ticket is presented with your name on it, identity is 
verified via a driver’s license or other accepted identification document and a thumbprint 
is scanned to enroll you into the amusement park database.  Upon return trips, a 
thumbprint is scanned, and the ticket presented.  By requiring both an item that you have 
and a verification of what you are, a significant increase in security is generated.  The 
amusement park has utilized two of the three main elements of identity authentication.  
The elements of authentication are what you have, what you know and what you are [3, 
6-7].     Many internet-based authentication systems only require one of the three 
elements, what you know.  A typical web-based security application may require a 
username and password to gain access to certain information.  Though the application 
may require two separate sets of information, it is still only requiring one of the three  
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elements, what you know.  Requiring two sets of information can be insufficient as the 
author’s recent personal experience on an auction website has demonstrated.  Others can, 
by various means, learn what you know.  A more secure system is a typical bank ATM 
system.  Here one is required to present a physical debit card, what you have, and a four 
digit numerical pin, what you know.  Though a four digit pin number is a weak security 
measure, it adds significant strength to the overall authentication system when a physical 
card is required.  The card increases security as one must learn the “what you know” and 
obtain the “what you have” in order to acquire access to the account.  The addition of a 
third element would secure access to a system even further.  By adding extra elements to 
an authentication system, one adds a significant degree of complexity to potential 
intruders.  In order for a system to be considered level 3 according to NIST document 
800-63 at least 2 of the three elements must be utilized in the authentication system [2].  
One may improve password strength by increasing password lengths or by adding a 
secondary password [11].  By adding another authentication element to an authentication 
system, an even greater improvement in system strength can be realized (see Figure 2.1).  
The general increase in authentication system strength can be represented by the 
equation,  
 








Sh = Susceptibility to system security breach: what you have  
Sk = Susceptibility to system security breach: what you know 




   
a)                                                 b) 
 
c) 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of susceptibility with 1-3 elements of authentication.  a) represents a one 
element system, b) represents a two element system and c) represents a three element system. 
 
Each axis in Figure 2.1 correlates to one of the three elements of identity 
authentication (KNOW, HAVE, and ARE). When only one element is utilized, the other 
two elements are 100% susceptible, because they are not utilized.  By adding additional 
elements, the overall volume, which is equivalent to the system’s susceptibility, is 
reduced. The maximum susceptibility, or maximum volume in Figure 2.1, is then        
Smax = 1.  If one of the elements is impenetrable the susceptibility of the element and 
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subsequently the system, is Si = Stotal = 0.  If one of the three systems is non-existent then 
it is equivalent to a completely susceptible breach of security, or Si=1.  A system that 
requires only a password may increase security of the system by adding additional 
character requirements.  In Figure 2.1a adding password characters is represented by a 
one dimensional reduction, specifically a reduction in the Sk dimension.  By adding a 
physical token requirement, a second element is reduced, as is illustrated in Figure 2.1b.  
Even a relatively poor secondary element generates significantly less susceptibility.  To 
equally reduce the susceptibility of the ‘password only’ system more and more characters 
are needed.  A longer password is harder to guess or crack.  “Cracking” a password can 
be done with software that repeatedly guesses at a password and keeps trying until access 
is granted.  A long password takes a long time to guess or crack, reducing susceptibility.  
However, even valid users can forget or mistype long passwords.  When a password 
exceed a person’s ability to remember it, the person takes shortcuts.  Consider that no 
amount of additional characters will increase the system security when a person writes 
their long password on a post-it note next to their terminal.   
By adding a secondary or tertiary means of authentication, even a substandard 
means, system security is increased.  For instance a banking system that requires a couple 
of items of knowledge can enhance their security by adding a required USB token that 
must be connected to your computer prior to account access.  Such devices limit intruders 
to those with physical access to the token. What can be known is information. By 
comparing submitted information to expected and/or stored information, identity 
authentication can be accomplished. What one has is a physical device. Identity 
authentication is accomplished in a ‘what you have’ system by comparing a user 
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possession, a physical device, to another physical device.  Often a ‘what you have’ 
system is a key-receptacle type system.  And “what one is” are their physical 
characteristics.  An intrinsic property of one’s physical characteristics is the difficulty in 
transferring those characteristics to another.  Information may be divulged, or a physical 
device may transfer hands, but as a rule it is much more difficult to transmit one’s 
attributes and/or features to another.  Circumvention may be considered the cost to trick 
or falsify a system, as in the cost of guessing an x-character password.  The difficulty of 
circumvention of a biometric is generally greater than that of the other two authentication 
elements.  For that reason, adding the biometric element of authentication to a secure 
system generates a clear benefit.   
 
Section 2 - Biometrics 
Biometrics is a measure of what a person is or what a person does (produces).  
The nature of biometrics makes it generally the least vulnerable to intentional 
falsification of the three authentication elements.  One may lose a credit card, or divulge 
a pin number, but it is significantly more difficult to give away what you are.  Attributes 
can be mimicked.  It is not impossible to lift a fingerprint, or replace your DNA sample 
with that of others.  As a general assumption it would require a significant increase in 
effort to ‘fake’ what one is, as compared to the other two authentication elements. 
There are two general types of biometric systems, static and dynamic.  A static or 
physiological system measures purely what you are, such as a retina scan or a fingerprint.  
A dynamic, or behavioral, biometric measures your actions, such as facial expressions, 
signatures, behavioral patterns or voice generation [5, 7].  Because of the requirement of 
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an action in dynamic biometrics, intrapersonal changes in an individual or changes in an 
environment play a role.  A signature of an individual is never exactly the same and over 
time may evolve in its primary, measurable attributes.  How to deal with the problem of 
intrapersonal variability is an issue and topic of research in dynamic biometrics, 
including speaker authentication [12-13].  Intrapersonal variability is not a significant 
issue in the relatively stable ‘static’ biometrics such as retina patterns or fingerprints, 
which for most people remain substantially constant throughout the majority of life.  A 
user or set of users’ acceptability of a method may limit certain static biometrics.  For 
instance, in internet applications that require data to be digitized and sent over the net, a 
fingerprint or DNA data may not be a comfortable fit with some users.  A third parameter 
may be access to technology.  DNA analysis or fingerprint reading technology may not 
be wide spread.  In an internet application a dynamic sample, such as a handwriting 
sample or voice sample, can be considered more acceptable to the user [14].  One 
advantage of voice as the biometric as opposed to signatures of thumbprints is the 
availability of the technology.  In many applications, the sole mode of system access 
and/or identity authentication for remote users is speech and it is often not considered 
intrusive [15].  One example would be a telephone banking system.  Speaker recognition 
is generally an acceptable, low cost, widely available technology.   
There is another broad division in biometrics: authentication (verification) versus 
identification [15-19].  Identification asks “who is he?” where authentication asks, “Is he 
who he says he is?”  The task of authentication is a much simpler matter as compared to 
identification.  It is a closed-set versus an open-set problem.  Generally any system used 
for identification could be utilized in an authentication application.  The same cannot be 
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said for authentication systems in identification applications.  Authentication is utilized 
for secure access in distributed systems. 
 
Section 3 – Basics of Speaker Recognition 
The specific biometric of interest in this thesis, is voice as measured by a speaker 
recognition systems.  Speaker recognition systems can be partitioned into one of two 
groups, text-dependent and text-independent [15, 19-20].  A text-dependent system is one 
in which the phrase or phrases that one speaks during enrollment are the same phrase or 
phrases as used when requesting authentication for system access.  These systems have 
an advantage in accuracy due to common word usage, pronunciation, prosody (rhythm 
and emphasis) and phone usage singularities in ones speech [7, 21].  Simple pattern 
matching algorithms are used with some text-dependent systems to verify the proper 
person is saying the proper phrase.  The basis of what is being measured in text-
independent systems fundamentally differs from text-dependent systems.  Text-
dependent systems attempt recognition by identifying how a user says a specific phrase.  
Text-independent systems use fundamental voice data buried in voice signals to do 
speaker recognition.  Because text-independent systems analyze basic voice information 
and not how a particular user says a particular phrase, the user is not required to speak 
any certain word or phrase. 
There are several voice attributes that can be analyzed to verify identity.  These 
attributes can be divided into two basic groups, low level and high level information.  
The low-level information, uses small time segments of the voice signals and analyzes 
the basic structure of one’s voice, i.e. signal spectrum, tone, frequency, etc [22].  Recent 
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research has also shown the viability of high level information used in conjunction with 
the more classic low level systems [22-27].  Some examples of high level information in 
speech include accent, pronunciation, often used words or phrases. High-level data is 
beginning to have a significant role in speaker recognition systems.   
Figure 2.2 illustrates the classification of a low-level, text-independent speaker 
recognition system within the framework of identity authentication systems.  Each box 
represents a possible classification at each step.  The solid lines represent the decision 
path used to decide upon a low-level, text-independent, speaker authentication system.  
The bracketed items represent favorable attributes sought after in a biometric system 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Classification of a short-term, text-independent, speaker authentication system 
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in a distributed environment. The first decision to be made is which combination of the 
three elements of identity authentication will be used in the system.  If the combination of 
authentication elements includes biometrics, then one must decide which type of system 
to use, dynamic or static.  The decision of which biometric to use is likely to be 
influenced by the partial list of parameters found in the brackets in Figure 2.2.  A more 
complete list is found in Table 2.1.  The characteristics used to evaluate and compare 
different biometrics include: cost, time, universality, distinctiveness, permanence, 
collectability, acceptability, circumvention, accuracy, repeatability, storage requirements, 













The cost parameter includes the money, time, equipment and expertise for the 
implementation of the system and the collection of the measurements. The time 
















































Cost     ++ ++ ++   
Time    ++ ++ ++   
Universality ++ ++  ++ ++ ++   
Distinctiveness ++ ++    -   
Permanence ++ ++    -   
Collectability  ++   ++ ++   
Acceptability  - + ++ ++ M  M 
Circumvention ++        
Accuracy ++        
Repeatability ++        
Storage 
Requirements 
  ++ ++  ++  ++ 
Availability of 
Technology 
 + M + ++ ++ - M 
++ = Great (or cost is low, time is short; hard to circumvent) ; + = Good; 
M = Medium; - = Bad; =- Terrible (cost is high);    
Blanks = no information 
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characteristic is specific to the measurement collection and analysis time.  That is, the 
time from when an identity authentication request is made until the access is granted or 
denied.    Universality is a measure of the portion of the sample population that are able 
to meet the requirements of the systems.  For example, everyone has DNA, but not 
everyone has hair.  So a DNA test is universally applicable, while hair color is not 
applicable to people without hair.  Distinctiveness is a measure of how unique or 
different the measurements for an individual will be from other individuals.  Finger prints 
are very distinct whereas weight is not.  Permanence is a measure of intrapersonal 
variations, the change in the biometric with the passage of time.  Collectability is the 
characteristic indicating how much effort is required to obtain samples for the biometric.  
Acceptability is a subjective measure of how willing a person is to submit to the 
biometric measurement.  Most of us would not submit to a blood test just to enter a gas 
station.  On the other hand, we readily submit to height measurements for carnival rides 
at the state fair.  Circumvention is the ease or cost to trick or falsify the measurement.  
Measuring weight is easy to falsify by carrying lead in one’s pockets.  A falsified eye 
scan is a bit more difficult.  The accuracy of a biometric is the probability that an 
individual will be properly authenticated.  Specifically, it includes the probability of 
properly authenticating the identity or access for authorized individuals and properly 
rejecting the identity or access for unauthorized individuals.  Repeatability is the variance 
of the biometric measurement over repeated trials.  The data storage requirement is 
evaluated both for the individual measurement as well as the total database of each 
individual measurement.  The availability of the technology is a make or break decision 
as well as a quantitative measure.  A biometric is not an option for immediate deployment 
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if it requires a technology that does not currently exists.  However, even if the technology 
exists, the ready availability of the technology is a factor.   For example, many computers 
and recording devices have the ability to capture a voice or a picture, but not many 
people have ready access to DNA or fingerprint collection devices.  The selection of a 
biometric based upon these characteristics clearly involves many tradeoffs.  How one 
weighs each of these decision factors, is a function of the application.  For many 
applications, as indicated in Table 2.1, speaker recognition is the best candidate.               
As stated previously, speaker recognition systems can also be divided by their 
specific objective: identification or authentication.  In speaker identification the system 
identifies who a person is out of some set which may include all human beings.  The 
system asks ‘who is he/she?’  In speaker authentication (or verification) a person’s 
identity is checked against a claimed identity.  In authentication, a system asks “Is he 
who he says he is?”  Speaker recognition systems, as well as all identity authentication 
systems, have two basic phases, enrollment and testing [20, 28].  In the enrollment phase, 
users train a system by providing an initial voice sample.  The ‘training’ or enrollment 
sample is compared to the later samples submitted for authentication.  The purpose of the 
enrollment phase of an identity authentication system is to generate a standard for the 
individual, which he/she will be measured against in the testing phase.  In the speaker 
recognition system, a standard is generated by modeling a person’s voice.  That model 
will later be used to check that an individual’s voice is the voice of an authorized 
individual.  Models of a system provide an efficient method for comparison.  During the 
authentication or testing phase, a basic speaker recognition system collects the analog 
voice signal, converts it to an analog electrical signal and then digitizes the signal.  From 
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the digital signal, some feature(s) of the voice signal is (are) extracted and measured.  
When the enrollment utterance is provided, a statistical model is generated.  The model is 
later compared to features from the ‘test’ samples.  After the two are compared a decision 
must be made if the person requesting authentication matched or not.  The main steps of 
the described system are outlined in Figure 2.3.  Additional processing enhancement 
steps can often be found in speaker recognition systems, such as filtering and score 
normalization.       
  
 
Figure 2.3: Overview of main components in a speaker recognition system 
 
Voice is produced by air being pushed up from the lungs through the glottal folds 
(vocal folds) and then through the vocal tract and eventually out of the speakers mouth.  
The vocal folds produce a base sound that is manipulated into specific phonetic events by 
the vocal tract [29, 30].  Lip radiation, mouth geometry and other biological functions 
also play minor roles in voice production.  For simplicity, these will be lumped together 
with the vocal tract in the following discussion.  In voiced speech, vocal folds contract 
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and relax creating a source of sound [30- 33].   The vocal fold sound is modified by the 
vocal tract to create specific noises such as vowels, consonants, etc.  Mathematically 
speech can be modeled as a source-filter system [30, 31].  The air from the lungs being 
pushed through the vocal folds would be the source.  The vocal tract would act as a filter.  
The source (vocal fold) and filter (vocal tract) would be convoluted together to generate 
the final voice signal.  The speech signal as a convolution of the two signals is illustrated 
in Figure 2.4.  The sound from the vocal folds is one of several features of a voice that 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Speech model as a source-filter convolution 
 
humans use to identify an individual just by hearing one's speech.  Other means, such as 
the high level features spoken of, are used for ‘identification by ear’ as well.  One method 
of performing automatic, text-independent, speaker recognition is to take advantage of 
the identifying properties of the vocal fold signal.  How can the vocal fold sound be 
analyzed independent of the vocal tract?  One answer is, by deconvolution.  
Deconvolution can be used because speech is a convolution of the vocal folds and vocal 
tract.  One method of deconvolution is by cepstral analysis.  The cepstrum fundamentally 
is the spectrum of the log of a spectrum, or alternatively, the cepstrum [34].  A cepstrum 
is a technique used for deconvolution of a signal.  The cepstrum is the inverse Fourier 
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transform of the log-magnitude Fourier transform of the signal (see Equation (2.3)) [35].   
The product property of logarithmic functions allows the spectrum of the voice spectrum 
to be mathematically separated into the log magnitudes of the vocal fold and vocal tract 
signals.  Because of the relative difference in quefrencies (frequencies in the cepstrum 
domain) of the vocal folds and vocal tracts, separating these signals can be accomplished 
with a simple lifter [36].  A lifter is a filter in the cepstral domain [34].  One common 
method to apply the lifter is by passing the log power spectrum of the signal through a 
filterbank [20].  Common speaker recognition systems space filters in the filter bank on a 
mel-spaced frequency scale, which closely resembles the auditory scale of the human ear.   










π     (2.3) 
 
The mel-spaced scale emphasizes the lower frequencies while attenuating some of the 
upper frequencies [16].  Passing a speech sample through the mel-scale filterbank allows 
for the general isolation of the excitation signal of the vocal folds.  The pseudo-code in 









Figure 2.5: Pseudo-code demonstrating the cepstrum deconvolution process 
Vocal_Tract*Vocal_Fold = Vf*Vt = Voice Signal    :Start with Voice Sample 
log|F(Vf*Vt) |             :Take Log of FourierTransform(FT)  
log| F(Vf).F(Vt) |           :FT of each signal portion 
log|F(Vf) | + log|F(Vt) |          :Additive properties of logrithm 
Filterbank(log|F(Vf) | + log|F(Vt) |)         :filterbank isolates vocal fold signal  
Mel-Cepstrum = F  -1 [MelFilter (log|F(Vf) | + log|F(Vt) |)] :Mel-Cepstrum of Voice 
Mel-Cepstrum ≈ F  -1 [MelFilter (log|F(Vf) |]  : Approximates Mel-Cepst. of vocal folds 
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In the implemented algorithm, the Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform (IDFT) of 
the filtered log-spectrum is taken [20, 37-39].  The IDFT gives N number of cepstral 
coefficients on the Mel-scale, called Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) [35].  
The MFCC’s of the entire utterance broken up into 20ms segments of speech are 
obtained.  In the enrollment phase, the MFCC’s are the features that are obtained that will 
later act as a measure of one’s voice, and thus one’s identity.       
     
 




The purpose of the enrollment phase of an identity authentication system is to 
generate a standard for the individual, which he/she will be measured against in the 
testing phase.  In the speaker recognition system, standard generation is done by 
modeling a person’s voice.  That model will later be used to measure the identity of an 
individual’s voice.  What are being modeled in the speaker recognition system are the 
MFCC vectors ( )ix
r .  The feature vectors are modeled using a tool called a Gaussian 
Mixture Model (GMM) [40].  A GMM is the combination of D-Variate Gaussians added 
piece-wise.  The component probability densities are given by Equation (2.4).  The GMM 




































        (2.5) 
N-number of MFCC’s are taken every 20 milliseconds.  For just a few seconds of 
sample speech, the amount of data for just one vector can occupy several thousand words 
of memory.  A specific system will have a number (N) of feature vectors, containing 
LX/.002s length data and modeled by D number of Gaussians, where LX is the length of 
the voice signal.  Other methods of metric creation were utilized prior to the application 
of GMM’s to speaker recognition.  Earlier methods include Hidden Markov Models 
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(HMM) and vector quantization (VQ) [15, 42].  Both HMM and VQ have proven to be 
more computational intensive with no, or only modest error rate improvements [21]. 
The selection of the number of Gaussians (D) has an effect on performance [40].  
A uni- or bi-variate Gaussian mixture is not likely to describe a feature’s distribution very 
well.  On the other end of the spectrum, as the number of Gaussians increase, the amount 
of information about the signal that each adds will decrease.  In fact, too detailed a model 
which contains information about background noise, or environmental acoustics can be 
detrimental to error rates [40].  Figure 2.7 shows the resulting GMM of the same speech 
signal feature distribution for various values of D.  As the number of Gaussians is 
increased, the model matches ever more closely to the actual feature distribution.  Figure 
2.7a uses a single variate Gaussian, giving a very loose approximation.  In Figure 2.7b 
the 3-variate GMM models the voice feature distribution’s basic contour well.  The 3-
variate GMM represents a significant increase in accuracy over the 1-variate system.          
Figure 2.7c, a 10-variate GMM also models this feature contour well.  Additionally the 
10-variate system picks up some singularities that could potentially distinguish an 
authenticated user from an imposter.  Figure 2.7d adds even more detail.  Figure 2.7d 
shows the voice feature as modeled by a 64-variate GMM.  The 64-variate model picks 
up some of the same singularities as the 10-variate system.  It also models minor 
idiosyncrasies in the feature distribution, which are most likely singular to the particular 






           
                       a)                                                                                  b) 
 
           
c)                                                                     d) 
Figure 2.7: a) 1-variate GMM, b) two-variate GMM, c) 10-variate GMM, d) 64-
variate GMM 
 
Figure 2.8 illustrates differences in voice feature distributions. Each of the four 
graphs represents the 2nd MFCC vector of sample utterances.  Figures 2.8a, 2.8b and 2.8c 
are three different voice samples from the same speaker.  Figure 2.8d is from a different 
speaker.  Figures 2.8a and 2.8b came from the same microphone.  The distributions in 
Figure 2.8a – 2.8c are similar in shape, but contain significant differences in detail.  
Because of the differences in detail, there is a limit to the efficacy of adding Gaussians to 
a GMM model.  Research has shown that minimal error rate improvement is realized by 
adding more than about 32 component Gaussians to a GMM [40].  In fact, adding too 





      a)                                                         b) 
 
c)     d) 
Figure 2.8: 2nd cepstral coefficients GMM.  a)-c) are the same speaker saying different phrases.  d) is 
a different speaker on system #2 saying same phrase as c).   
 
 
With the enrollment model in the system, a voice sample being tested for 
authentication can then be compared and scored against the model of the enrollment 
speech signal.  The task of authentication is to determine if the speaker is who he/she 
claims to be.  Basically, the task is a hypothesis test.  The hypothesis is ‘the speech 
sample Y0 is from the modeled speaker YM’ [43]. The hypothesis test can produce one of 
4 results [3, 14, 44].  A true accept (TA) occurs when the system correctly authenticates 
an authorized individual.  A true reject (TR) occurs when the system correctly rejects an 
unauthorized individual.  Error types I & II can also occur from the hypothesis.  A Type I 
error occurs when the authorized individual is falsely rejected (FR).  A Type II error 
occurs when an unauthorized individual is falsely accepted (FA).  The four possible 
results are listed in Table 2.2 [14]. 
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There is a tradeoff in the FR and FA rates.  NIST provides a detection cost model 
for measurement of speaker detection performance.  It is given by Equation (2.6) [45]:   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )MMMM YYYFAFAYYYFRFRDet PPCPPCC −××+××= ≠= 100 ||   (2.6) 
 
 In Bayesian decision theory, an optimal decision is found at the minimum of Equation 
(2.6) [46].    FRC  and FAC  are the costs of a FR and FA respectively.  ( )MYYFRP =0|  and 
( )MYYFAP ≠0|  are, respectively, the probability of a FR given the real user and FA given an 
imposter.  The a priori probability of the specified speaker YM is ( )MYP .  Minimizing the 





























The numerator is simply λ0, where λ0 is the likelihood that Y0 is from YM.  The 
denominator is λ1, where λ1 is the likelihood that Y0 is not from the modeled speaker YM.  
Thus the overall likelihood, λ, equals λ0/λ1 [20].  In this thesis, the log of the likelihood 
ratio (LR) is used because it is less computationally intensive.  The likelihood of Lx 
observations compared to a single component of the mixture model is given by (2.8).    
 
 



























μ      (2.8) 
 
Taking the log of the likelihood gives: 
 
 
















πσμ            (2.9) 
 
The model used to determine λ0 is simply the Gaussian mixture model developed in the 
enrollment phase.  The model used to determine λ1 is not as clear.  The difficulty is in 
modeling who a person is not.  The difficulty in an open set application leaves an 
unbounded set of possible speakers, which can be difficult to model.  The approach that 
has been used in much literature is the universal background model (UBM).  The UBM is 
a voice feature model generated from a collection of other speakers [47].   
The process of tuning the detection threshold (θ) is one of the more difficult tasks 
in designing a speaker recognition system.  In part, the difficulty is due to the tradeoff 
between false accept and false reject rates and the need of the particular application.  A 
system requiring high security may weight the cost of a false accept much greater than 
the cost of a false reject.  Higher false reject rates with lower false accept rates may be an 
inconvenience to user’s who are more often falsely rejected, but allows fewer 
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unauthorized individuals from gaining access to the system [14].  The high security 
system described works great for a nuclear arms facility but may be less effective for a 
system that allows fast food workers access to the freezer, which requires regular and 
speedy entrances.  To assist in threshold setting, a detection error tradeoff (DET) curve 
can be developed [48].  A DET curve plots the FR and FA error rates as a function of the 
threshold level.  In this thesis, as λ approaches zero, the more likely the voice sample Y0 
is from speaker model YM.  Therefore, when the threshold is a large negative number, 
many FA can be expected.  As the threshold tightness is increased (θ→0), less and less 
false accepts are expected and more false rejects would be expected.  At θ = 0, all users, 
including authorized ones would be rejected making the FR rate = 1.  In Figure 2.9, when 
θ is -4, the FR rate is 100% while the FA rate is 0%.   Increasing θ to -16 yields a FR rate 
    
  
 
Figure 2.9: An example Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curve 
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of 13.3% and a FA rate of 5%.  The threshold was loosened, allowing a few people to be 
falsely accepted.  The same threshold loosening reduces the amount of Type I errors 
(FR).  With an even looser threshold of -23, the FA rate is up to 85% and the FR is at 0%.   
In review, the task of speaker recognition can be split into two phases, enrollment 
and testing.  The basic setup of a speaker recognition system includes speech signal 
collection, feature extraction, feature modeling, signal comparison and decision making.  
Other common tasks in speaker recognition systems include pre-emphasis to mimic the 
outer ear, pre-signal filtering to mitigate background noise, cepstral domain filtering for 
removal of static channel effects (such as cepstral mean subtraction and RASTA 
filtering), and score normalization for mitigation of intra-speaker variations, handset 
enrollment/testing mismatches and other environmental variations [49-54].     
 
 
Section 4 – Historical Review of Speaker Recognition 
The modern system described in Section 3 is an accumulation of advancements 
made over the last 50 years.  Today’s automatic speaker recognition systems verify user 
access rights, identifying personnel in a group, and they even have some use in forensic 
applications.  Early research in speaker recognition was in the realm of human abilities.  
War time research in the 1940’s allowed for significant advances, producing a tool to 
allow visual inspection of voice.  Advances in signal processing techniques and the rise 
of the computer permitted true automated systems to be developed.  The first automated 
system was created in the 1970’s.  From that point forward, the main thrust of research 
has been in independent speaker recognition.  Today’s speaker recognition research 
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focuses on lowering error rates, capabilities in identification and creating systems robust 
in the presence of environmental variations.       
The problem of recognizing an individual by their voice is an age old issue.  The 
book of Genesis records Isaac’s dilemma in speaker identification when Jacob acts as an 
imposter to Esau.  Isaac’s confusion was with contradictory results from two different 
biometrics.  “The voice is Jacob’s voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.”   Jacob 
trusted tactility over auditory “and he discerned him not” [55].  The problem of 
recognizing an individual by their voice arose throughout history and even appears in a 
recorded judicial case as early as 1660 [56].  It was much later before academic research 
would begin a scholarly investigation of this topic.        
In March of 1932, Charles and Anne Lindbergh’s baby boy was abducted and 
subsequently killed.  The investigation led to a clandestine payoff in a cemetery where a 
Lindbergh operative met with an anonymous male claiming to be the kidnapper.  Charles 
Lindbergh sat in a nearby car.  Lindbergh overheard the anonymous man say “Hey 
Doctor, Over here, over here”.  The event was the second time Charles Lindberg had 
heard the man’s voice without seeing his face.  Two and a half years later at the trial of 
the accused kidnapper, Bruno Hauptmann, Lindberg claimed to be able to identify 
Hauptmann’s voice as the same voice heard in the cemetery [56].   
The Lindberg claim spurred Frances McGehee to initiate the first academic 
research of reliability of earwitnesses.  Her research led to the publication of two 
significant articles on the topic [57, 58].  Since McGehee, research into speaker 
recognition has been continuous in forensics and psychology.  The later development of 
the automatic speaker recognition system can also trace its roots to the work of McGehee. 
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In 1962 the first article on an automated (semi-automated) method for speaker 
recognition was published in Nature by a Bell Laboratories Physicist, Lawrence G. 
Kersta.  The paper was entitled “Voiceprint Identification” [59].  Two years previous, 
Bell Laboratories had been approached by law enforcement agencies about the possibility 
of identifying callers who had made several verbal bomb threats over telephone lines 
[60].  The task was given to Kersta.  After the two years of research he claimed he had a 
method to identify individuals with very high success rates. His method utilized earlier 
work on speaker recognition performed by three other Bell Laboratories’ scientists, 
Potter, Kopp and Green who were working on voice identification for military 
applications during World War II.  They had developed a visual representation of speech 
called a spectrogram.  A spectrogram records the frequency and intensity of a speech 
signal with respect to time.  Kersta’s claims of identifying speech via spectrograms 
sparked several research projects over the next year.  In fact, his article sparked an entire 
field of research.  There were several dissenting views in the next few years and it 
seemed no other researcher was able to duplicate the high claims Kersta had made [60].  
To help settle the matter, a substantial research project was undertaken by Oscar 
Tosi, a professor at Michigan State University who had doubts about Kersta’s so called 
“voiceprint”.  In conjunction with the Michigan State Police and sponsored by the 
Federal Department of Justice, Tosi’s research yielded promising results. Tosi’s results 
tended to support Kersta and lent validity to the field.  Tosi’s results were refuted by Bolt 
a year later as he illustrated holes in the Tosi experimental methodology [60].  Tosi’s 
experiment lacked scientific basis in practical applications.  The FBI, being interested in 
the forensic application of speaker identification, requested another study be performed 
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by the National Academy of Sciences.  The results from the study showed that the 
technical uncertainties in forensic applications were substantial enough to claim the use 
of voiceprints were unreliable in real applications.  However, voiceprints are still useful 
in certain circumstances.  In fact the FBI has utilized a form of Kersta’s spectrographic 
analysis as late as 2002 [60].   
The Kersta method is an aural-visual method.  From a voice sample a 
spectrograph is produced.  The spectrogram is then inspected visually for pattern 
matching and scored by the interpreter.  Success rates with the Kersta, spectrogram 
method, given an expert interpreter and proper environmental circumstances, can be very 
high.  Despite success, the Kersta method requires human interaction, limiting its use in 
automated security applications.  Also, “the good performance reported in Kersta’s paper 
has not been observed in subsequent evaluations simulating real-life conditions” [7].   
Though the Kersta method is still utilized in some forensic applications, such as 
with the FBI, it has not materialized into a practical autonomous speaker recognition 
system.  The reasons are many, human interpretation being a major factor.  Other 
techniques have since been employed allowing for low computing costs with high 
success rates.           
It was in the 1960’s when several developments made autonomous automatic 
speech recognition possible.  These developments covered a broad range of disciplines 
and for the most part were independent of speaker recognition research.  For instance, 
Gunnar Fant produced the first physiological model of human speech production in 1960 
[29].  This and similar research that followed, became the basis for understanding how to 
analyze speech for both speaker recognition as well as automatic speech recognition.  It 
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led to the understanding of voice as a linear source-filter model, which allowed for a 
better understanding of identifiable characteristics in an individual’s voice.      
As computers became more accessible to more scientists, problems of 
implementation of continuous-domain mathematical solutions in a discrete machine arose 
more and more often.  The issue was critical to digital signal processing.  In 1965 Cooley 
and Tukey published their method of digital implementation for the Fourier transform.  It 
is now known as the Cooley-Tukey Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [61].  The FFT gave 
scientists an efficient method of frequency analysis in computer based systems.  It was a 
major advance and it coincided with other investigations at the time.  Two years earlier in 
1963 Bogert, Healy and Tukey had published a study on echo detection in seismic signals 
titled “The Quefrency Analysis of the Time Series for Echoes: Cepstrum, Pseudo-Auto-
Covariance, Cross-Cepstrum, and Saphe Cracking” [34].    The oddly titled paper 
described a method of echo detection by taking the “spectrum” of a log-magnitude 
spectrum.  During the same period, Oppenheim’s research into homomorphic signal 
separation, such as decovolution, led to him defining the complex cepstrum, which is the 
Fourier transform of the log spectrum, i.e. a spectrum of the spectrum [62].  The 
cepstrum is described in section 3 of this chapter.  The complex cepstrum has become a 
standard method used in speaker recognition systems.    
 In another completely unrelated study in the late 1960’s Leonard E. Baum and 
others developed a stochastic model for Markov processes.  The process attempts to 
determine hidden parameters of a statistical model from observable features in the model 
and is called the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [63].  The HMM statistical model would 
find broader application in the parallel studies of speech recognition.  The HMM also has 
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a smaller role in speaker recognition.      
The fortuitous developments of the 1960’s have become the basis for modern 
speaker recognition systems.  It was also during this period that parallel investigations 
into automatic speaker recognition system began.  For instance, Pruzansky, a Bell 
Laboratories Engineer, investigated early systems for automatic speaker recognition 
utilizing spectral pattern matching techniques [64, 65].  The spectral pattern matching 
systems had a measure of success.  However, the first completely autonomous speaker 
recognition system was a multimodal system which utilized voice and signature analysis.  
It was developed by a team led by George Doddington at Texas Instruments in 1977 [21, 
64].  The Doddington system used digital filter banks to do spectral analysis.  It was a 
text-dependent system that prompts the user for the correct verification phrase.  The 
output vector of a 14-channel filter bank is used in a ‘Euclidian distance’ based algorithm 
to make a verification decision [7].  Over many years, the Doddington system had a false 
rejection rate of less than 1% and a false acceptance rate of less than 1% [7].   
The early recognition features used as measures included spectral resonance, filter 
banks vectors and linear predictive coefficients.  As shown above, these features had a 
good level of success.  The early successful systems were all text-dependent.  Since that 
time research has been able to improve on the early text-dependent successes.  
Investigations into text-independent methods since those early days have continued.  
Today, text-independent research constitutes the brunt of the speaker recognition 
research.  Text-independent research differs from the text-dependent research as 
scientists look for underlying indentifying attributes, as opposed to spectral pattern 
matching or phonetic event measurements.  Text-independent research is more frequently 
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applied to speaker identification, as opposed to the simpler task of verification.   
The application of Bogert and company’s brainchild, the cepstrum, to speaker 
recognition gave a marked improvement in recognition systems.  Cepstrum based 
features have now become standard in recognition systems [21].  Modern recognition 
systems use the homomorphic deconvolution capabilities of the cepstrum to separate the 
vocal fold attributes from the vocal tract attributes in the linear source-filter model of 
human speech production.  As of today, the cepstrum and cepstrum coefficients play an 
integral role in speaker recognition.    
 As important to an accurate recognition system as voice feature selection / 
extraction is, the pattern matching and decision making algorithm is equally important.  
The Hidden Markov Model, developed in the late 1960’s, was employed widely in 
speech and speaker recognition systems during the 1980’s.  Also, a method of vector 
quantization (VQ), compressing a speaker feature vectors down to a small set, also had 
some success in modeling voice features.  However, later research showed that with 
enough enrollment data the HMM and the VQ was about as effective as the less 
computationally demanding Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [21, 40].  Though the 
HMM has wide application in speech recognition, it is found less often in low-level 
speaker recognition systems.   
The field of speaker recognition study has also made significant improvement 
from the simple Euclidian distance method found in the TI system.  The system that has 
evolved throughout the early years of recognition research includes a few basic tasks.  
These tasks are, feature extraction, feature modeling and classification or decision 
making.  The feature matching algorithm which computes the likelihood that one user’s 
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voice sample matches the modeled enrollment samples.  The classification methods have 
also made significant improvement from the simple Euclidian distance method.  A fairly 
straightforward, simple decision algorithm may be a likelihood test of the Gaussian 
Mixture Model of cepstrum features.  Though there are many enhancements to the simple 
authentication system as described, several other methods are being investigated.  The 
basic system presented represents a wide range of modern speaker recognition systems. 
Several advances have been realized in the system detailed above.  For instance, 
squaring the log-magnitude spectrum prior to taking the cepstrum can magnify the voice 
signal while mitigating the effect of background noise.  One major area of interest has 
been score-normalization [20].  Any given speaker has a measure of variability between 
his own samples.  Intrapersonal variations are due to many factors including, emotional 
state, throat illnesses, phonetic content and background noise. One objective of score-
normalization is to mitigate the intra-speaker variability effect.  Another objective is to 
mitigate channel and other environmental effects.  Throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s a 
significant amount of speaker recognition system research has been focused on score-
normalization [20].      
Score normalization research has largely been based on the work of Li and Porter 
which presented a method of using imposter score normalization [53].  Their research led 
to the UBM or “world-model” approach a few years later where a model, often derived 
from a cohort of imposters is used in the statistical model of the speaker’s enrollment 
model.  The log-likelihood between the speaker and world models error rates are 
measured against a threshold in order to make an authentication decision.  The way these 
models are derived have advanced throughout the last few years and have led to advanced 
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world-models and score normalizations.   
Research continues in various fields today.  One topic in speaker recognition 
research is the continued research into feature selection.  Notably, Reynolds, Campbell 
and others have undertaken the collaborative investigation into the usage of high level 
information [22-23, 26-27].  Use of multimodal biometric and multimodal user 
authentication , obtaining confidence levels in a specific systems recognition accuracy 
and identification applications are all current topics in literature [8, 10, 25, 37, 43].      
 
 
Section 5 – Outstanding Issues in Speaker Authentication Systems 
One specific area of research continues to be environmental variability, such as 
background noise, intrapersonal variations and handset variability.  Environmental 
concerns become a major factor in applications where unknown conditions exist, such as 
in distributed systems.  With the advent of the internet and security applications over the 
internet, such as internet banking, security needs in unknown conditions have become 
more and more relevant.  Therefore, research into environmental concerns has gained an 
increased focus in speaker recognition [66].  There have several compensation techniques 
presented that have had success in filtering environmental noise.  Background noise has 
been dealt with primarily through filtering [20].  Current research seeks to improve these 
methods [67, 68].  
Handset mismatches refers to differences in the voice capture system used in the 
enrollment phase verses the system used in testing for authentication phase.  When a user 
is enrolled with one system and attempts recognition with another, it gives significant 
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error rates.  Early on Doddington discovered that such mismatches could produce errors 
in the range of 50% [7]. Differing transducers can affect a voice spectrum by changing 
spectral characteristics such as band-limiting and shaping [15, 69].  Much has been done 
to attempt to mitigate the enrollment / testing mismatch obstacle.  Cepstral mean 
subtraction, RASTA filtering, and use of delta coefficients have all been used in attempts 
to mitigate handset mismatch effect.  Each of the listed methods have had a degree of 
success.  However, they need to be greatly improved.  It has been proposed on several 
occasions that more research into the effect of microphone variation is needed [15, 20, 
66].  Some research has been conducted to understand the mismatched condition [70-73].  
Some attempts at solutions have also been made [70, 71].  One shortcoming of these 
studies has been their focus on telephone systems.  Today, the need for a variety of 
networked systems is required.  This thesis approaches the problem of a mismatched 
condition from a distributed environment standpoint.  Also, little or no research has been 
performed to understand general performance of microphones compared to one another 
in similar environments.  Another objective of this thesis is to investigate the effect of 





MEASURING EFFECTS ON SPEAKER RECOGNITION 
 
Section 1 – Objective of the Experiment  
The objective of the experiment is to determine the effect of equipment variations 
on error rates in speaker recognition systems.  The first effect that is analyzed is the 
degradation or improvement of FA / FR rates when enrollment microphones and testing 
microphones are mismatched.  The mismatch effect has been assumed in the past [70].  
This study attempts to quantify that the enrollment / training mismatch has a specific 
effect on speaker recognition FA and FR rates.  The second effect that is analyzed is the 
change in FA and FR rates from one system to the next in similar environments.  The 
analysis of the second effect includes direct comparisons between each system’s 
performance under matched and mismatched conditions in varying background noise 
levels.  The comparison would indicate, in a given environment, that 1) some 
microphones perform better than most others, 2) some microphones perform worse than 
most others, 3) all microphones perform about equal or, 4) microphone performance is 
distributed with some performing better than most, others performing worse than most 
and some in-between.  The characteristics of the performance distribution would indicate, 
in each environment, the sensitivity of a system’s performance to the variation in 
recording equipment.  Further, these distributions in each environment will be compared  
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to determine if a particular microphone(s) is (are) generally better suited for the task of 
speaker recognition. 
 
Section 2 – Experimental Setup  
Ten system setups were investigated, including seven different microphones.  
Each microphone is a common, real world, device.  The selected systems represent a 
small sampling of typical home and office equipment that is currently available on the 
market.  The focus of the study is security in distributed systems such as the internet.  
Therefore, microphone selection was based on was on common equipment likely to be 
used in distributed systems.  The selection includes several PC interfacing microphones 
as well as handheld devices.  The full list is found in Table 3.1.    
 
Table 3.1: List of microphones used in the experiment 
System# Short Description Setup Manuf. Model# 
1 Desktop Microphone 1" from Speaker     
2 "Quick Cam" Webcam  1" from Speaker Logitech 960-000247 
3 "Quick Cam" Webcam  12" from Speaker Logitech 960-000247 
4 Hands free Microphone 1" from Ear GE   
5 Hands free Microphone On Ear as Designed GE   
6 Logitech Gaming headset On Head as Designed Logitech   
7 Digital Voice Recorder 1" from mouth Olympus WS-100 
8 Sys#4 / Sys#7 
sys#4 Plugged into 
sys#7 GE/Olympus WS-100 
9 Digital Voice Recorder 
Same model, different 
unit as System #7 Olympus WS-100 
10 MP3 Player 1" from Speaker     
 
Five speakers were selected, 3 male, 2 female.  Each spoke three phrases (See Appendix 
E) into each of the ten systems.  The process was repeated in three various background 
noise levels.  A fourth phrase was spoken into all ten systems by all five users on a 
different date.  The systems are the items under investigation, not the speakers.  The 
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number of users is not statistically significant for investigation into speaker discrepancies 
but is designed to give a variety for the testing of the equipment.  Likewise the phrase 
usage is not for understanding phrase discrepancies, but rather to give a variety for the 
testing of the equipment.  Utilizing various individuals and phrases throughout the 
experiment mitigates how various users or specific phrases affect the results.     
 
Table 3.2: List of controlled variables in the experiment 
Parameters Quantity Description 
Systems 10 systems (7 Microphones) See Appendix 
Speakers 5 users 3 male, s female 
Background Noise 
Levels 3 
Zone1 (<45dB), Zone2 (55-65dB), 
Zone3 (80-95dB) 
Phrases 4 
Phrase1 (~3sec), Phrase2 (~3sec), 
Phrase3 (9sec), Phrase4 (~30sec) 
Decision Algorithm 2   
 
The phrase used for enrollment, was Phrase 3 in each case.  The data from the enrollment 
phrase was put into the recognition system developed for MATLAB.  The components of 
the implemented speaker recognition system, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 include feature 
extraction via mel-cepstrum MFCCs, feature modeling with a GMM that utilizes an 
expectation maximization algorithm [41], a likelihood comparison, and then a decision 
algorithm.  There are two decision algorithms used in the experiment.  The first is a 
‘Nearest-To’, or shortest distance algorithm.  The person with the log-likelihood closest 
to zero is accepted and everyone else rejected.  The second algorithm is the threshold 
decision algorithm. The threshold algorithm sets an initial threshold θ.  Which side of the 
θ the log-likelihood score falls determines whether one is accepted or rejected.  If λ < θ 
then Y0 is hypothesized to come from YM and the speaker is accepted.  Else, if λ > θ then 
the speaker is rejected.  In the algorithm the threshold θ is varied over an appropriate 
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range.  As θ is varied FA and FR rates are recorded. The outcomes of the two algorithms 
are described in Chapter IV.  To determine how error rates are affected, each system is 
evaluated with the enrollment and testing systems matching and mismatching.  An 
individual system is enrolled and then tested against each of the ten systems.  Resulting 
error rates are evaluated for both matched and mismatched enrollment/testing conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Outline of speaker recognition system used in experiment 
 
The background noise levels were controlled within the specified decibel ranges.  
In Zone1, as measured at the microphone at the beginning of each session, the 
background noise level was less than 45dB.  Zone 2 static noise was added and decibel 
level was controlled between 55-65dB.  Zone 3 had an increase in static noise.  Zone 3 
also had an addition of dynamically changing, non-voice noise.  The Zone 3 background 
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noise was controlled in a range of 80-95dB.  The frequency range of the background 
noise was not controlled.      
    
  Section 3 – Description of Recording Environment 
The physical environment was an isolated area with precautions made to mitigate 
outside noise.  In Zone1 (<45dB), precaution was taken to mitigate sound by isolating the 
PC and turning off all other devices in the room (such as the air conditioner).  Zone2 (55-
65dB) the noise was increased by turning on fans, the air conditioner, having the PC near 
the recording area and having low magnitude level static from a radio at a given distance 
from the recording area.  Zone3 (80-95dB) was the same as Zone2 with an increase in the 
radio static and the addition of a given portion of the first movement of Beethoven’s fifth 
symphony.  Background noise levels were taken at the beginning of each user’s session 
(a session includes one speaker uttering a set of three phrases into 10 systems on the first 
day and one phrase into 10 systems on the second day).  The background noise level was 
recorded with RadioShack’s “7-range Analog Display Sound Level Meter”.  
Measurements were taken within a few inches of the user’s mouth.  The database 
generated in this research is specific to common distributed systems.  Devices and 
background levels were selected for a distributed system.  The database varies from 
available commercial voice sample databases.   
 
  Section 4 – General Discussion of Results 
A total of 500 voice samples were collected.  Average file size was 840kB.  All 
voice samples were saved as .wav files in a PCM Stereo format at a 44.1KHz sample rate 
and a 16 bit AD conversion.   Voice samples taken with both handheld voice recorders 
 43
(items 7&8) as well as the MP3 player (item 9) save their data files in an MP3 format.  In 
order to stay consistent and to analyze these files in the MATLAB speaker recognition 
system, the MP3 files were converted to WAV files with formatting consistent with the 
rest of the experiment.  Research into the effects of speech compression algorithms on 
speaker recognition has been conducted [74].  Results from the research indicated that 
these algorithms had little to no effect on the error rates of the system.  Phrases 1-3 were 
recorded 113 days prior to Phrase 4.  Phrase 4 was not uttered in Zones 2 or 3.  Voice 
samples were analyzed via a speaker recognition program developed for MATLAB.  The 
decision algorithms were coded in VBA.  A flow chart for the MATLAB portion is found 
in the appendices.      
Table 3.3 gives a time domain representation of each speaker’s voice as they say 
Phrase 3 in each zone as they spoke into System 1.  Table 3.4 shows the frequency 
domain of the same samples.  Table 3.5 is Table 3.6 except the y-axes are adjusted to 
illustrate the spectrum shape.  Zone 3 noise is readily seen.  Zone 2 noise is not as 
apparent unless viewed with the adjusted y-axes.  The voice sample from Speaker 1 in 
Zone 2 was low magnitude at all frequencies.  Noise was low as well.  The low noise 
level could be due to user variability such as the direction of the microphone in relation to 
the speaker and noise sources.  It could also be due to equipment malfunctions such as a 
loose microphone connection.  The entire recording session with Speaker 1 in Zone 2 on 
System 1 had attenuated amplitudes.  This appears to be an anomaly as it was not noted 




           Table 3.3: Time domain of voice signals – System 1 Phrase 1 
 











Table 3.4: Frequency domain of voice signals – System 1 Phrase 1 
 




























RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Section 1 – Description of Analysis Techniques  
The four possible results for identity authentication are a true accept (TA), a true 
reject (TR), a false accept (FA) and a false reject (FR).  The FA and FR rates will be used 
for analysis.  The FR rate is defined as the number of individuals falsely rejected divided 
by the total number of people who should be accepted.  Likewise, the FA rate is defined 
as the number of individuals falsely accepted divided by the total number of people who 
should be rejected.  By plotting these two rates as a function of the threshold, a DET 
curve is developed.  The point at which the FR rate and the FA rate cross is called the 
equal error rate (EER) [20].  The EER holds information about a system’s susceptibility 
to a security breach as well as information about a system’s usability.  Though the equal 
error rate is not associated to any specific threshold setting, it can be used as a 
comparative measure of performance between systems.  The EER is an arbitrary point 
which is used to indicate a system’s ability to authenticate authorized individuals and 
decline imposters.  The EER is not necessarily the minimum error point.  It has 
traditionally been used as a relative measure between systems. The EER would be a good 
relative measure between systems if the FA slope and FR slopes of each system was 
identical.  For identical slopes, a linear shift in θ would not indicate a change in the  
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system’s performance. A high threshold value would be just as valid as a low threshold 
value as long as the EER was sufficiently low.  However, in real systems an EER at a 
higher threshold can be an indication of a poorly performing system.  A system that can 
properly classify voice signals, in respect to the speaker, with a high level of success will 
naturally have a λ close to zero for a TA and a significantly more negative λ for a TR.  
With a large disparity in the average λ for the cases of TA and TR, error rates can be 
mitigated.  It is proposed that a dead-band could be injected into the decision algorithm.  
The decision algorithm output for the dead-band would supplement the ‘accept’ and 
‘reject’ possibilities by a third ‘undetermined’ value.  What is done in a system when an 
undetermined is found would be subject to system design.  The system could prompt the 
user to re-enter a voice sample or in multimodal systems, a separate identity 

































λ        (4.1) 
 
When analyzing speaker recognition systems, traditionally, the DET curves are 
used as design tools and the EER is a loose method of comparing performance.   The 
DET curves give more information than the point at which the two error rates cross.  For 
instance, the slope of the curve in the region of concern is a measure of the system’s 
robustness to changes in the threshold (θ).  To illustrate this point, examine Figure 4.1.  
Systems 1 and 2 in the graph have the same EER.  However, these are two distinct 








stringent thresholds.  The EER is 5% at θ = -5.  By loosening the threshold to -7, the FA 
rate increases up to 35% while the FR rate is down to 1%.  A slight change in thresholds 
generates a significant change in error rates for both error types.   
 
 
        Figure 4.1: A DET curve of 2 systems with equivalent EER 
 
For System 2, a slight change is not as detrimental to either rate.  The EER is 
again at 5%.  The threshold θ is -16.  A threshold change of -2 in this case leads to a FA 
rate of 13% and a FR rate near 0%.  This example demonstrates the robustness to changes 
in θ.  Further studies are needed to evaluate if the slope of the DET curve could be an 
indicator of system robustness to environmental changes as well, such as background 
noise, channel effects and equipment variations.  In this study, performance is measured 
with the standard EER and the accompanying threshold level.  The EER as well as the 
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EER threshold level will be used in comparing systems in the analysis of the experiment 
utilizing the threshold decision algorithm.     
The ‘Nearest-To’ Algorithm designates the speaker in a test set with the λ nearest 
to zero as the ‘Accepted’ user.  All other speakers in the test set are rejected.  For the 
‘Nearest-To’ Algorithm, a test set is defined as testing each speaker in the group once (all 
in the same zone with the same microphone saying the same phrase).  Each test set 
produces likelihood ratios λi for each speaker in the set.  From each test set, the λ that is 
closest to 0 will be accepted while all others will be rejected.  The ‘Nearest-To’ decision 
process utilizes a specific case of the DET curve.  When the correct speaker is accepted, 
all others are rejected.  Thus, in the ‘Nearest-To’ algorithm, with the correct speaker 
accepted, FA = FR = 0%.  If an imposter is accepted and all others are rejected, those 
being rejected will include the correct speaker.  Therefore a false accept equals a false 
reject, FA = FR = 100%.  For example, if the speaker model, YM, came from Speaker 1 
while Speaker 5 speech sample Y5 had the greatest likelihood of coming from YM, then 
Speaker 5 is accepted and all other speakers, including Speaker 1, is rejected.  Thus the 
FA rate equals the FR rate in every case.  For simplicity, the error rate used is where 
error rate = FA = FR.   
     
Section 2 – Results from ‘Nearest-To’ Decision Algorithm  
Table 4.1 gives the overall average results of the ‘Nearest-To’ decision algorithm 
experiments grouped by systems.  It is a brief summary of Appendix A.  One result made 
clear in Table 4.1 is the wide disparity in error rates of matched systems versus miss-
matched systems.        
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Table 4.1: Breakdown by System of 'Nearest-To' results 
  AVE Matched Mismatched 
System #1 54% 13% 58% 
System #2 66% 11% 72% 
System #3 66% 27% 71% 
System #4 62% 18% 67% 
System #5 68% 20% 73% 
System #6 61% 11% 66% 
System #7 48% 16% 51% 
System #8 50% 2% 55% 
System #9 51% 4% 56% 
System #10 74% 18% 80% 
AVE 60% 14% 65% 
 
The Chart in Figure 4.2 shows how much of a role the miss-matched systems have in 
system performance.   
 
Figure 4.2: 'Nearest-To' match / mismatch comparison chart 
 
Variation in error rates per speakers increased with the background noise level (see Table 
4.2).    Error rate variation as dependent on phrase was negligible.  The average of the 
standard deviation of error rates per phrase per zone was 0.024.     Table 4.3 gives an 
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overall summary of the results of the ‘Nearest-To’ algorithm experiment.   
 
Table 4.2: Standard deviation of scores per speaker per Zone 
 σ 
Zone 1 .042 
Zone 2 .093 
Zone 3 .173 
 
 
Table 4.3: Summary of 'Nearest-To' algorithm results 
 
   Zone1 Zone2 Zone3  
Total Ave 53% 62% 65% 60% 
Ave Matched 1% 28% 13% 14% 
Ave Mismatched 59% 66% 71% 65% 
 
 
  In a low-noise environment, the matched system error rate was one percent.  In 
the same environment the mismatched error rate was 58% higher.  In both Systems noise 
had an effect.  From Zone 1 to Zone 3 a total error rate increase of 12% was observed.  
The noise effect was insignificant when compared to the mismatched system error rates. 
 
Section 3 – Results from Threshold Decision Algorithm 
This section gives the threshold decision algorithm results.  Each System in each 
zone has 2 DET curves (see Appendix C for all DET curves).  One curve is for matched 
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Systems and the other for mismatched Systems.  Figure 4.3 shows a baseline 
measurement of the speaker recognition system enrolled on System 5.  Figure 4.3 
includes voice samples from all three background noise levels, all speakers, and from all 
microphones.  The graph is an example of what a system’s results would be in a system 
without controls or constraints on the testing phase.   
 
 
           Figure 4.3: DET curves for System #5 with no constraints in the testing phase 
 
 
In order to review system error rates of the ten systems in a comprehensive 
manner the DET curves are summarized by discussing the equal error rate (EER).  The 
graph in Figure 4.4 is a summary of all of the EER for each System in matched 
conditions.  Each point represents the EER of 5 speakers uttering 4 phrases in a single 
zone and on a single system.  They are grouped by system.  Each system has three points.  
The points represent the error rates in the three background noise-level zones.  In all but 
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one case, the point furthest to the left (most negative) is the Zone 3 EER.  The exception 
is System 1 where the Zone 2 point (center point) is further to the left.  Furthest to the 
right is Zone 1 in each case except System 6.  System 6 has the Zone 2 furthest to the 
right.  The Zone 2 EER in 7 of 10 systems is the highest of the three system values.  
Further discussion of the EER behavior is found in Section 4 of this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: EER for all Systems in all zones under matched conditions 
  
Of note in Figure 4.4, the EER generally increases as the threshold point of the 
EER becomes more negative.  Recall that if each system had the exact same curve that a 
shift along the x-axis would be insignificant and that the EER alone would be sufficient 
to rate a system’s capability.  However, in real systems, when a threshold is relatively 
large, the EER is likely to increase.  The EER increase is illustrated more clearly in 
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Figure 4.5, which shows the general EER threshold decrease with EER increase by 
displaying a linear trend line for data sets in each zone.  In a system that produces a λ 
close to zero for a TA and a λ much more negative for a TR (a system that can  
 
 
Figure 4.5: EER and linear trends for Zones 1-3 
 
distinguish well between an imposter and an authorized individual) the point at which the 
FA and FR meet will be low.  Ideally, as the threshold is loosened (becomes more 
negative) the FR rate will be zero before the FA rate curve can begin to increase, leaving 
an EER of zero.  The same scenario, where λ is close to zero for TAs and much more 
negative for TRs, indicates that a FA will not occur until θ is much more negative.  
Likewise, false rejects will not occur until the likelihood is near zero.  The increase of FR 
as the likelihood approaches zero is because of the system’s ability to detect an 
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authorized individual at a λ close to zero.  Therefore, as θ increases along the x-axis, the 
EER increases along with it.  In Figure 4.4, the best performing system are in the lower 
right corner (close to zero on both the x- and y-axis) and the worst performing system are 
in the upper left portion of the graph.  Most systems’ equal error rates ranged between 
30-45%.  However, the range of System 1 was well below most systems at 7-28% and 
System 10 was well above most systems at 50-55%.      
For systems with a mismatched condition, EER were greater.  The distribution of 
EER from the mismatched systems was for the most part tighter with the exception of 
System 10 (See Figure 4.6).  System 10’s threshold level for Zone 1 was -75, for Zone 2 
was -77 and Zone 3 was -325, with EERs of 0.511, 0.495, and 0.540 respectively.  All  
 
 
Figure 4.6: EER for all Systems in all zones under mismatched conditions 
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other threshold levels were between 0.395 and 0.504.  Performance change due to noise 
was greatest when the background noise level was increased from Zone 1 to Zone 2.  
From Zone 2 to Zone 3, performance variations were less with some performance 
improving.   
 
Section 4 – Discussion 
The results of the ‘Nearest-To’ decision algorithm further validates the notion that 
the condition of mismatched enrollment and testing microphones has a major effect on 
speaker recognition system performance [70-72].  Noise had an effect on the error rates.  
When the noise level increased from <45dB in Zone 1 to 55-65dB in Zone 2, the EER 
generally increased and the threshold level generally became more negative.  This EER / 
threshold relationship was true for both the matched and mismatched systems when 
moving from Zone 1 to Zone 2.  The relationship held true as well for the mismatched 
systems moving from Zone 2 to Zone 3.  However, a different phenomenon was observed 
in the matched systems when increasing the noise from Zone 2 to Zone 3.  In these cases, 
θ continued to increase, however, the EER decreased in 80% of the cases (see Figure 4.4 
and Table 4.4).  Recall that it was stated that the EER would generally increase as the  
    
Table 4.4: Percent of Systems with EER & θ Looseness Increases with Increased Noise 
MISMATCHED CONDITION MATCHED CONDITION  
THRESHOLD θ EER THRESHOLD θ EER 
Zone1 to Zone2 
60% ↑ 70% ↑ 90% ↑ 90% ↑ 
Zone2 to Zone3 
90% ↑ 80% ↑ 90% ↑ 20% ↑ 
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threshold increased.  The increase did not occur when going from Zone 2 to Zone 3 with 
matched conditions.  One explanation for this is that the FA / FR ratio changes.  As the 
noise increases to a loud level, the FR rate will naturally increase (the curve will move 
left) as it is harder to isolate and extract clean voice features.  However, the increase in 
noise also makes it hard for an imposter to match the voice sample YM.  The imposter’s 
inability to be falsely accepted moves the FA curve left.  The change in ratio explains an 
increased θ even with a decreased EER.  It is not that the system improved, just that the 
ratio of errors was altered.  The lower EER with higher thresholds illustrate the idea that 
θ is required to describe system performance.  It is important to note that the EER is not a 
design point but a point of simple comparisons on the DET curves.     
Even in the presence of noise, the mismatched condition was the variable in this 
study that had the most prominent effect on system performance.  This effect is further 
illustrated in the threshold decision experiment. The probability distributions are plotted 
in Figure 4.7.  The dotted lines represent the mismatched zone.  Note that in each case the 
mean EER of the mismatched condition is significantly higher than the matched 
condition.  Also of note is the variances of the matched cases are significantly larger than 
that of the mismatched cases.  The difference in variance denotes a shift in system 
performance of a few systems.  The EER in mismatched conditions never approach the 
low rates seen in the matched condition.  However, on the high error rate end of both 





Figure 4.7: Zones 1-3 for matched and mismatched conditions - Probability 
distribution of Systems’ EER 
 
 
By overlaying the graph in Figure 4.4 with the graph in Figure 4.6, as is done in 
Figure 4.8, the shift in EER and threshold can be seen.   The mismatched condition equal 
error points had a tighter distribution than the matched condition.  The average threshold 
level shifts up 28.1% and the EER has a 22.5% increase when a system goes from 
matched to mismatched conditions.  It is clear that the mismatched condition has a 










The second objective was to compare each system against each other to determine 
if some recording systems perform better than others in speaker recognition systems.  The 
comparison between systems is illustrated in Figure 4.4 and 4.6.  The graph in Figure 4.9 
shows the EER of each zone stacked on top of one another.  The stacked plots allow one 
to look at each system in each zone and compare.  The stacked plots represent the sum of 
EERs in the three zones and illustrates overall relative performance.  When under 
mismatched conditions, systems had a summed EER of 1.25 to 1.55.  This range 
broadened to 0.5-1.54 for matched conditions.  Several systems performed notably better 
in matched condition, especially when in Zone 1.  System 1 in Zone 1 had an EER of 7%. 
Even in its worst performing zone (Zone 2) System 1 had an EER of 28%.  System 1 
performed better that other systems given matched conditions.  It is also of note that 
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Systems 7 and 9, which were the same model microphone, performed similarly in most 
cases.  By reviewing Figures 4.4, 4.6 and 4.10, it can be seen that System 10 was by far 
the worst performing system in all cases.  System 10 was one of the four systems that 
  
 
Figure 4.9: EER Summary  
     
required a file format change.  However, the format change did not appear to play a major 
role as Systems 7, 8 and 9 also had format changes and were among the top performers.  
In matched conditions it is clear that some systems are significantly better suited for 
speaker recognition than others.  In the mismatched condition, it is not as clear how much 
performance depends on the recording system.  System 10 still performed significantly 
worse (see Figure 4.6), however the rest of the systems had a significantly smaller 
deviation from the norm.  In matched conditions, the microphone plays a significant role 
in speaker performance.  Choosing the proper microphone for the authentication system 
is important.  Or in the case of uncontrolled microphone usage, such as in many 
distributed systems, it would be important to consider the recording system and design 
accordingly.  One such method for design may include utilizing a proper score 
normalization technique.  A method of evaluating microphone error rates, such as the 







Section 1 – Summary 
In distributed systems automatic identity authentication is a difficult aspect to 
control.  Often identity authentication systems can decrease susceptibility to a security 
breach by adding extra elements to the authentication of one’s identity.  There are three 
main divisions in the methods of identity authentication; what you know (example: 
password or login), what you have (example: debit card or key) and what you are 
(biometrics).  Biometrics is a measure of what you are or what you do.  Speaker 
recognition, the biometric of voice, utilizes one’s voice as a metric to detect a specific 
speaker.   
Over the past five decades great strides toward wide-spread commercial speaker 
recognition systems have been made.  Early research in speaker recognition was in the 
realm of human abilities.  Later war time research allowed for significant advances, 
producing a tool to allow visual inspection of voice.  Advances in signal processing 
techniques and the rise of the computer permitted true automated recognition systems to 
be developed.  Early systems such as Doddington’s text-dependent system found 
measures of success spurring on the research for automatic text-independent systems.  
One of the outstanding issues in the field of speaker recognition is handling 
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environmental variations such as channel effects, background noise, intrapersonal 
variation and microphone variability.  Much progress has been made in these areas.  Yet, 
environmental variations remain as one significant dilemma to real world speaker 
recognition, especially in distributed systems.      
For speaker recognition systems in a distributed application microphones are apt 
to vary.  Frequency response to different microphone transducers can vary widely.  
Microphone variation can produce two non-matching signals for the exact same 
recording.  The objective of the research was to discover whether or not the varying of 
microphones has an effect on the ability of a speaker recognition system to perform 
identity authentication.   
The task of speaker recognition is divided into two phases, enrollment and testing.  
An enrollment voice sample was taken, features extracted, and a model generated.  
During the testing phase a voice sample was taken, features extracted, the extracted 
features were measured against the model and a decision was made, accept or reject.  The 
system used in this research used the common feature of MFCCs and common modeling 
method of GMM.  A log-likelihood ratio comparison was used in the decision process.  
There were two decision algorithms used in the experiment.  The first was a ‘Nearest-To’ 
algorithm where the person with the log-likelihood ratio closest to zero was accepted and 
everyone else rejected.  The second algorithm was a threshold algorithm.  The FA and FR 
rates were measured as the threshold θ was varied.  Which side of the θ the log-likelihood 
score fell on determined if one was accepted or rejected.  The specific objective of the 
research was to determine how error rates vary with respect to a variation in 
microphones.  Two types of microphone variation were investigated.  The first type of 
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variation study was to understand effects on system performance when the microphone 
differs from the enrollment to the testing phase.  The second type of variation study was 
to understand how a system performs in relation to other microphones when in similar 
environments and setups. 
 
Section 2 – Conclusions 
The research in this thesis demonstrated and utilized a method of evaluating 
microphones for use in speaker recognition systems via error rates.   The experimental 
results show the effect that microphone variability has on the error rates of speaker 
recognition systems.   Two types of microphone variation that alter the error rates of a 
speaker recognition system are illustrated in the results.  The first type of variation 
analyzed was when the enrollment and testing microphones were different.  This is 
referred to as a mismatched condition.  The second type of variation analyzed was how 
different microphone error rates vary without regard to environmental conditions such as 
matched and mismatched conditions.  First, mismatched systems are responsible for 
significantly higher FA & FR rates.  The mismatched-transducer effect has been seen as 
well in past studies, though the past studies have focused on telephone applications.  The 
research presented in this study concurs with previous assumptions, that the mismatch 
condition has a significant effect on speaker recognition error rates.  Noise affected error 
rates as well.  However, the noise effect was insignificant when compared to the effect of 
a mismatched condition.    
The second analysis showed that some microphones had better speaker 
recognition error rates than other microphones.  The EER for System #1 had lower error 
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rates with more stringent thresholds.  System #10 error rates are significantly higher than 
the majority of systems and are more than 40% higher than System #1.  The rate 
variations illustrate that speaker recognition system design must account for microphone 
variability in order to be viable in distributed environments.  
A method of evaluating microphones for use in speaker recognition systems was 
successfully demonstrated and utilized.  In the case that a false accept has a higher 
associated cost the method can be used to assist in threshold setting.  If a false reject is 
more important, the method is just as useful for threshold setting.  Further studies are 
needed to evaluate if the slope of the DET curve can be used as an indicator of system 
robustness to environmental variations.  The system utilized in the research had typical 
classifications of accept or reject.  A future study ought to be undertaken to evaluate error 
rates in systems with a third ‘undetermined’ classification.     
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APPENDIX A  
 
Error Rates for ‘Nearest-To’ Algorithm 
 
 
Appendix A provides a table of results from the ‘Nearest-To’ decision algorithm.  Rows 
of the table dictate the system used for enrollment.  In the top portion of the table the 
columns of the table indicate which system was tested and in which zone.  Each cell’s 
percentage rate is the percentage rate of 15 samples including all 5 speakers saying 
Phrases 1-3.   The bottom section of the table is a summary of the top portion.  This 
includes matched (same microphone used in enrollment and testing phases) and 
mismatched conditions (microphone used in enrollment phase is differnet than 
microphone used in testing phase) for each of the zones, total error rates and total error 





































APPENDIX B  
 
False Accept and False Reject Rates 
 
 
Appendix B provides includes a sample table utilized for calculating and plotting DET 
curves and EER in the threshold algorithm.  The FR and FA rates are shown for both the 
matched (same microphone used in enrollment and testing phases) and mismatched 
condition (microphone used in enrollment phase is differnet than microphone used in 
testing phase) for all users saying Phrases 1-3 on a particular enrollment system in a 










APPENDIX C  
 
Detection Error Tradeoff Curves 
 
This Appendix provides detection error tradeoff (DET) curves for each enrollment 
system.  Each DET curve represents all speakers saying Phrases 1-3 in a specific zone.  
The dashed lines represent false accept (FA) rates and the solid lines represent false reject 
(FR) rates.  The X-axis in the DET curves are the log likelihood ratio, abbreviated LR.   


























































































































































































































Distribution of Speaker Likelihoods for True Accepts (TA) and True Rejects (TR) 
 
Appendix D plots the distribution models of the likelihood scores of Systems for 
true accepts, true rejects and a sample of matching a true accept with a true reject 



















Phrases 1-4 Used For Voice Samples 
 
 
Appendix E contains a list of the phrases used in the voice sample collection stage of the 
thesis.  Phrase 1-3 were utilized during sample collection on October 18th 2008.  Phrase 4 
was utilized during sample collection on February 8th 2009.  Phrase 4 was only spoken in 
Zone 1.  Phrases 1-3 were spoken in each zone.   
 
Phrase 1:  
 “Hello my name is (user states first and last name)”   
 Typical time duration:  ~2-3 seconds  
 
Phrase 2:  
 “Can you tell me how to get to Sesame Street?”   
 Typical time duration:  ~3 seconds  
 
Phrase 3:  
 “A Winston Churchill Quote: I like pigs.  Cats look down on us, dogs look up to us, but 
pigs, they treat us as equals.”   






Phrase 4:  
“ I, Nephi, having been born of goodly parents, therefore I was taught somewhat in all 
the learning of my father; and having seen many afflictions in the course of my days, 
nevertheless, having been highly favored of the Lord in all my days; yea, having had a 
great knowledge of the goodness and the mysteries of God, therefore I make a record of 
my proceedings in my days. Yea, I make a record in the language of my father, which 
consists of the learning of the Jews and the language of the Egyptians.” 
 Typical time duration:  ~28-33 seconds 































Appendix F contains the program listings for all customized programs utilized throughout 
the thesis.  The first section is the MATLAB portion of the speaker recognition.  The 
second section includes MSExcel VBA programming.  The VBA code is the two decision 
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Scope and Method of Study: The purpose of this study was to examine the effects that 
equipment variation has on speaker recognition performance.  Specifically 
microphone variation is investigated.  The study examines the error rates of a 
speaker recognition system when microphones vary between the enrollment and 
testing phases.  The study also examines the error rates of a speaker recognition 
system when microphones differ in similar environments and conditions.  The 
metric for evaluation of effect is the false identity acceptance and the false 
identity rejection error rates.       
 
Findings and Conclusions:  The results of the research demonstrate that microphone 
variation has a major effect on speaker recognition error rates.  Error rates include 
the rates of false acceptance and false rejection of identity.  The effect of a 
training / enrollment microphone mismatched was significant.  Mismatched 
conditions produce significantly greater false accept and false reject rates as 
compared to matched conditions.  In fact, the mismatched condition had a more 
significant impact on error rates than noise.  The research also demonstrates that 
speaker recognition error rates are microphone dependant.  The microphone 
dependency was seen in both the matched and mismatched condition.  However, 
the microphone dependency was more prevalent in the matched condition.   
Microphone selection has an effect on error rates in different environments and in 
matched and mismatched conditions.  The research provides a method to evaluate 
the direct effects of microphone selection on speaker recognition systems.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
